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Abstract 
This paper presents a formal model of the (dis)incentives for entrepreneurial 
behavior in organizations. The model extends research on the stigma of failure into 
organizations by examining the implications of more conservative and more 
experimental organizational cultures on the incentives for entrepreneurial action by 
the corporate-funded employee.  The discussion also derives implications for why 
organizations may chose to incubate new businesses in separate divisions, 
suggests why the stigma of failure may not always apply in public-sector 
organizations, and suggests why the development of entrepreneurship within 
organizations may be path-dependent. 
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Executive Summary 
This paper represents the outcome of a year-long analysis that began with 
observations we made about the implementation of RFID technologies in U.S. and 
allied militaries.  Why, we asked, were Active RFID deployments proceeding at a 
clip, but Passive RFID deployments appeared to be crawling along, missing their 
deployment targets, or not getting deployed at all?  Why might the U.S. Marines 
make a significant commitment to implementing Active RFID in their supply chain at 
a time when major commercial enterprises (such as Wal*Mart) have committed to 
implementing Passive RFID in their supply chains?  After all, despite its current 
technological superiority, Active RFID is very significantly more expensive to 
implement in a large scale supply chain than Passive RFID, whose performance 
capability is rapidly evolving and catching up with user expectations.  Why would 
managers so vastly prefer an expensive, Active system to an inexpensive, albeit 
less-proven, Passive system? 
After accounting for the operational needs of various services and the 
technological capabilities of different kinds of RFID systems, we considered that 
behavioral factors might also be playing a role in the choice of which RFID systems 
to implement.  We began to consider the hypothesis that fear of failure might be one 
factor affecting managerial choices about which kind of technologies to implement in 
their organizations.  Why?  Because failure is broadly stigmatized in all kinds of 
organizations and societies.  Managers concerned with their career prospects 
therefore fear being identified as having failed, and this affects which projects they 
prefer to pursue.  This led us to research the general phenomenon of stigma of 
failure in organizations. 
The central message of the paper is quite intuitive and quickly summarized.  
Stigma of failure may be understood as a social mechanism for conveying 
information about the quality of managers.  In conservative organizational cultures, 
managers are penalized for failing.  Since managers know this is the case, they 
pursue safe projects that are unlikely to fail.  If, in turn, they fail in these projects, 
 - xiv - 
then failure indicates that they are likely poor managers.  By contrast, in 
experimental organizational cultures, managers are willing to undertake risky 
projects that are more likely to fail; therefore, when failure does occur it tells little 
about the quality of the manager.  Managers aren’t penalized for failing when 
everyone in the organization knows they the project was a highly risky one.  The net 
result is that organizations have different cultures that correspond with different 
kinds of behavior by managers – some more entrepreneurial, some more routine.  
These different kinds of organizational cultures are reflections of what has long been 
observed about attitudes towards failure across different nations and states.  
Compare the U.S. and Japan.  Entrepreneurs who fail in the U.S. (especially in 
California) are unlikely to become outcasts in the managerial world.  But fail in 
Japan, and members of society strongly penalize you.  In our view, large 
organizations (such as the DoD) are likely to have their own Californias (i.e., 
divisions that attach a low stigma to failure) and they may have their Japans (i.e., 
divisions that strongly penalize failure). At the limit, ultra-conservative organizations 
may drive out entrepreneurial behaviors altogether. 
Of course, this is the antithesis to the kind of innovative, risk-taking 
managerial ethos that various organizations in the DoD appear to be attempting to 
develop.  However, as we explain in the paper, the analysis we provide also 
suggests reasons why the stigma of failure may not always apply in public-sector 
organizations.  To the extent that independently-qualified professionals manage 
projects and the fate of projects is viewed as outside the control of project 
managers, then failure does not convey much information about the quality of project 
managers.  This points to one of the many strengths of the DoD project 
management system.  
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1.  Introduction 
This study is based on seminal work by Landier (2005), who examines why 
countries and regions differ in their cultural acceptance of entrepreneurial failure.  In some 
countries and regions, entrepreneurial failure is stigmatized; yet, in others, little social 
negativity is attached to failure.  The term “stigma” refers to an attribute that is deeply 
discrediting that reduces “a whole and usual person to a tainted, discounted one” 
(Goffman, 1963, p. 3; Sutton & Callahan, 1987, p. 406).  For example, while failed 
entrepreneurs are often stigmatized in France and Japan, a culture exists in California’s 
Silicon Valley in which failure is practically a badge of honor (Bengtsson, 2005; Saxonian, 
1994). Landier captured this basic phenomenon in a model of asymmetric information.  In 
his study he explains that, when choosing potential projects, entrepreneurs in conservative 
cultures will pursue suboptimal, but safe, projects.  If, in turn, they fail in these pursuits, this 
will indeed indicate that they are most likely unable to carry entrepreneurial activities to 
fruition.  This information is circulated via a stigma of failure, which may be understood as 
a social mechanism for conveying information about the quality of individuals.  In contrast, 
in experimental cultures, all entrepreneurs are willing to undertake risky projects that are 
more likely to fail; therefore, a failure event conveys less information about the quality of 
that entrepreneur.  Hence, it makes less sense for stakeholders to penalize the 
entrepreneurs for failures, and the stigma is not attached to failed entrepreneurs.   
In this paper we hybridize Landier’s model with the literature on corporate 
entrepreneurship, which is defined as the process by which one or more individuals 
instigate a new organization or innovation within an existing organization (Sharma & 
Chrisman, 1999, p. 18). Corporate entrepreneurship is characterized by innovative, 
experimental behaviors that have a high probability of failure (Miller, 1983; Thomke, 1998). 
Several researchers have already examined factors influencing the creation of a corporate 
“atmosphere” in which entrepreneurial behaviors may flourish or be suppressed and have 
identified a potential role for how failure is managed by an organization (Burgelman, 1983; 
Stevenson & Jarillo, 1990). According to Farson and Keyes (2002), “[N]owhere is the fear 
of failure more intense and debilitating than in the competitive world of business, where a 
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mistake can mean losing a bonus, a promotion, or even a job.” Prominent business 
leaders such as Jack Welch and Robert Shapiro appeared to have noted the effect of 
managers’ fear of failure on their choices. During his tenure as CEO of Monsanto, Shapiro 
observed that employees were terrified of failing. Thus, he attempted to change 
perceptions about failure in order to encourage risk-taking.  Jack Welch attempted to 
suppress fear of failure at General Electric by “rewarding failure.”  Such prominent efforts 
at managing failure in a positive way only serve to underline the reality that failure is 
stigmatized to some significant extent in many organizations.  Yet, the mechanisms 
underlying this phenomenon are still not well understood. In a recent review, Kuratko and 
colleagues state that significant research questions remain; in particular, “research is 
needed to further clarify the linkage between the presence of specific qualities in an 
organizational context and individuals’ (such as middle-level managers) decisions to act 
entrepreneurially” (Kuratko, Ireland, Covin, & Hornsby, 2005, p. 711). 
In this study, our purpose is to explore the role of stigma of failure by modeling the 
(dis)incentive regime for corporate entrepreneurship.  We proceed as follows:  In the next 
section, we conceive a simple economic model in which we consider, in turn, self-financed 
entrepreneurship, VC (venture-capitalist)-financed entrepreneurship and corporate 
entrepreneurship. Section three discusses several themes that emerge from the model 
and relates them to other research on these topics.  Conclusions follow. 
 - 3 - 
2.  Model 
Case I:  Self-financed Entrepreneur 
We begin by considering a self-financed entrepreneur. This case is a benchmark, 
useful because the risk-neutral, self-financed entrepreneur can make decisions without 
concern for the market’s imperfections. 
In period 0, the entrepreneur initiates a project that matures in period 2. Before the 
project starts, the entrepreneur expects the project to have probability πH of being 
successful, πM of being mediocre and πL of being a total failure. These probabilities are 
true only if the entrepreneur is intrinsically competent—a fact unbeknownst to him.  The 
manager may be competent (with probability θ) or not.  If he is not competent, the project 
will necessarily fail. 
In period 1, the manager will receive a private signal (pH, pM or pL) indicating the 
likelihood that the project will be successful. Each project has a start up cost I and a 
possible successful outcome X.  Projects are initiated if and only if: 
 θ π H pH + π M pM( )X − I > 0. (1) 
Clearly, pH > pM > pL.  If pH = 80%, pM = 30% and pL = 0%, the entrepreneur 
receives a signal that the project has 80% chance of being successful, or 30% chance of 
being successful, or that it will fail for sure. 
A self-financed entrepreneur would certainly continue if he receives a signal pH.  It 
does not mean that the project will certainly succeed (that pesky 20% chance of failure still 
exists!).  For example, if the project is worth X = $1Million, there is pH probability of getting 
that return, and (1 - pH) probability of not gaining it.  So, the expected value of the project is 
pH X = $800k. 
If the same entrepreneur receives a signal pM, he may or may not continue.  He 
knows that he is a good manager; otherwise, his signal would definitely be pL.  So, he 
might continue if the expected payoff is greater than the payoff of starting all over again 
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with a new project, which may be more successful or not.  In this example, the expected 
value of continuing this project is just pM X = $300k.  If the self-funded entrepreneur 
abandons the project, he starts a new venture which requires another start up cost I. Let’s 
say that I = $100k, πH = 40%, πM = πL = 30% and θ = 40%.  This new venture has an 
expected value of (πHpH + πMpM)X - I = (32% + 9%)$1M - $100k = $310K.  Since continuing 
is worth $300k, a risk-neutral, self-funded entrepreneur would prefer to start over. 
 
Figure 1.  Transition Diagram (4 states) 
If the entrepreneur receives a signal pL, he is sure that the project is a dud.  
However, he does not know if it was his fault or not:  the signal does not let him know if he 
is a competent manager.  The pool of failed entrepreneurs includes incompetent managers 
(1 – θ) and unlucky competent managers (θ πL).  By receiving the signal pL, the probability 
that he is a competent manager is now reduced to: 
 ′ θ = θπ L 1−θ + θπ L( )< θ . (2) 
 - 5 - 
An entrepreneur with prior entrepreneurial experience follows a different decision 
process.  Figure 1 shows the transition diagram with four states of competence recognition 
(reputation) and the probabilities to transition from one state to the next.  All entrepreneurs 
are originated from state 0 (no prior experience).  Initial experience moves them from state 
0 to states G (good manager), U (good manager, but unknown to himself), or B (bad 
manager, unknown to himself).  After n experiences, an entrepreneur that has seen pH or 
pM at least once knows that he is a good manager, and finds himself in state G.  If the 
manager has only seen pL, he does not know if he is good or not, and maybe in state B 
(which he will never leave) or in state U (which he might eventually leave, if he continues 
long enough).  The probability that he is in state U, given that he has seen pL in all n 
ventures that he has experienced, is: 
 ′ θ n = θπ Ln 1−θ + θπ Ln( )< ′ θ . (3) 
Clearly, as n increases, θ’n approaches 0.  In our example, suppose that n = 3, and 
the entrepreneur observed pL each time.  Hence, θ’n = 0.77%.  The risk-neutral 
entrepreneur initiates yet another project only if: 
 ′ θ n π H pH + π M pM( )X − I > 0 . (4) 
Case II:  VC-funded Entrepreneur 
Here, the venture capitalist provides initial capital I to fund a project with estimated 
earning potential X.1  The venture capitalist receives a compensation R if the project is 
successful and 0 if it fails.  The entrepreneur keeps X-R if successful and 0 otherwise.  
Entrepreneurs initiate projects if and only if: 
X − R( )> 0 . 
                                            
1 Some results in this section have been proposed by Landier (2005).  They are here presented for 
completeness. 
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The VC-funded entrepreneur has to deal with market imperfections because, unless 
he completes the project with some level of success, the VC never knows if he is 
competent or not.  Moreover, the market wants to ensure that competent managers always 
complete projects with signal pH  to prevent strange behaviors such as “compulsive 
entrepreneurship” (an abnormal situation when the entrepreneur is not committed to bring 
the project to fruition).  Also, the market wants the entrepreneur to treat projects with 
mediocre signal pM according to the typical willingness to take risk in that market.  The 
market induces this behavior by adjusting the cost of capital for previously failed 
entrepreneurs in period 2.  If the cost of capital for failed entrepreneurs is R’, he will 
continue only if: 
 pM X − R( )> π H pH + π M pM( ) X − ′ R ( ).  
If the entrepreneur sees a signal pL, he has no incentive to continue this venture, 
but he may consider starting a new venture if the cost of capital is less than its potential 
return (X > R’).  Since the market cannot distinguish competent managers among both 
entrepreneurs that failed voluntarily after receiving a mediocre signal and those that failed 
because they received a poor signal, all failed entrepreneurs are subject to the same cost 
of capital. 
Subcase a) Conservative financial market 
The conservative market is defined as the one that imposes high cost of capital to 
failed entrepreneurs.  Consequently, if the entrepreneur sees pM, his reaction is to continue 
with the project—even though he knows that it will provide only mediocre returns. 
Otherwise, his next venture will be funded with expensive capital.  That is, in this market: 
 pM X − RCM( )> π H pH + π M pM( ) X − ′ R CM( ).  
Landier recognizes this as an incentive compatibility constraint, meaning that R’ is 
the venture capitalist’s return on successful entrepreneurship that induces the correct 
behavior for this market. 
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The risk-neutral venture capitalist, not knowing if competent managers lead the 
projects that she funds, requires a return on investment coherent with the project’s 
probability of success, considering the composition of the respective pools of managers: 
 RCM = IpM π M + pHπ H( )θ  and ′ R CM =
I
pM π M + pHπ H( ) ′ θ CM  (5) 
… where ′ θ CM  is the probability (in the eyes of the VC) that a second-timer is a good 
manager.  In this market, the pool of failed entrepreneurs contains just entrepreneurs that 
received the signal pL.  Hence, ′ θ CM  is: 
 ′ θ CM = θπ L 1−θ + θπ L( )< θ . (6) 
Since ′ θ CM < θ , we have that RCM < ′ R CM , which is consistent with the hypothesis that 
conservative markets assign higher cost of capital to failed entrepreneurs.  However, if the 
entrepreneur sees pL, he knows that the project will fail; so, he drops it.  He may ask the 
VC to invest in another idea—if the cost of capital justifies.  He will start a new project if 
′ θ CM π H pH + π M pM( ) X − ′ R CM( )> 0 . 
An entrepreneur with prior experience exposes the venture capitalist to a different 
decision process. If the venture capitalist has access to information about the final 
outcome of each of the entrepreneur’s prior projects, the transition diagram in Figure 1 
also represents the entrepreneur’s reputation in a VC-funded conservative market.  If the 
manager’s record shows at least a successful event, he is in state G.  If the record only 
shows failures, it implies that he has only seen pL.  Neither the VC nor the entrepreneur 
knows if he is good or not.  The probability that he is in state U, given that he has seen pL 
in all n ventures that he has experienced, is: 
 ′ θ n ,CM = θπ Ln 1−θ + θπ Ln( )< ′ θ CM . (7) 
To fund the next venture by experienced entrepreneurs, the risk-neutral VC expects 
as payoff 
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 RG,CM = IpM π M + pHπ H  and 
′ R n,CM = IpM π M + pHπ H( ) ′ θ n,CM  (8) 
… where RG,CM is the payoff charged a manager in state G, and R’n,CM is the payoff 
charged a manager with n experiences, none of them successful.  Clearly, 
RG,CM < RCM < ′ R CM < ′ R n,CM  
… where n > 1.  In order to allow some level of entrepreneurship in the conservative 
market, we must have X > RG,CM  (ventures which are led by managers that gained 
successful experience in other markets, or funded their own successful projects) or 
X > RCM  (ventures in which venture capitalists fund inexperienced managers).  As long as 
X > ′ R n,CM , managers that failed their first n projects may attempt yet another venture.  The 
appendix summarizes the results in this and in other sections. 
Subcase b) Experimental financial market 
The experimental market encourages a high level of entrepreneurship.  It does so 
by keeping the cost of capital low for failed entrepreneurs, so managers that observe less-
than-stellar signals about their projects may choose to abandon them to start new ventures 
that might provide better payoff. 
If the entrepreneur sees the signal pH, he is expected to complete the project—he 
cannot obtain a better signal than this.  Yet, there is one valid concern in this situation: 
since the cost of capital for failed entrepreneurs is not punitive, the VC must adopt 
incentives that lead to the completion of projects that receive a good signal.  Hence, 
 pH X − REM( )> π H pH + π M pM( ) X − ′ R EM( ).  
Notice that by including the possibility of completing a mediocre project in second 
period, the inequality makes it even more profitable for the entrepreneur to continue the 
high-prospect project.  If the signal is pM, the entrepreneur in this market prefers to drop 
the project and start a new venture.  To induce this behavior: 
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 pM X − REM( )< π H pH + π M pM( ) X − ′ R EM( ).  
Again, the possibility of completing both high-prospect and mediocre projects next 
period makes it even more profitable to abandon mediocre projects in the first attempt.  
Combining these two expressions, the incentive compatibility constraints in the 
experimental market are as follows: 
 π H pH + π M pM
pH
< X − REM
X − ′ R EM
< π H pH + π M pM
pM
. (9) 
Observe that the expression on the left is less than 1, and the one on the right is 
greater than 1.  Hence, the cost of capital for failed entrepreneurs may or may not be 
higher than for first-timers:  in this market, REM  may be greater than ′ R EM  or not.  The pool 
of first-time failed entrepreneurs includes managers that chose to fail after seeing pM and 
managers that failed after seeing pL (because of competence or not).  In the eyes of the 
VC, the probability that a first-time failed manager is competent is: 
 ′ θ EM = θ 1− π H( )θ 1− π H( )+1−θ < θ . (10) 
The risk-neutral venture capitalist, not knowing if competent managers lead the 
projects that she funds, requires this return on investment: 
 
REM = IpHπ Hθ . (11) 
The transition diagram in Figure 2 shows that, over time, the entrepreneur can be in 
five different states in the experimental market.  After n ventures, a manager that has seen 
pH at least once finds himself in state (G,K) because he is good, and this is publicly known.  
If he has seen pM at least once but never saw pH, he is in state (G,U) because he is good, 
but he can’t credibly convince the market that he is because he has never concluded a 
project.  If he never observed pH nor pM, he is in state (U,U) if he is good, or in state (B,U) 
if he is bad, but he can’t possibly know which is true.  To ensure that entrepreneurs in state 
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(G,K) always conclude high-prospect projects and always forego mediocre projects, the 
incentive compatibility constraints are: 
pH X − RG,EMm( )> π H pH + π M pM( ) X − RG,EMm +1( ) and 
pM X − RG,EMm( )< π H pH + π M pM( ) X − RG,EMm +1( ), 
… where m is the number of failed ventures since the manager last experienced a 
successful project.  These constraints simplify to: 
 π H pH + π M pM
pH
< X − RG,EM
m
X − RG,EMm +1




Figure 2.  Transition Diagram (5 states) 
Since the entrepreneur concludes only those projects that have high prospects, the 
VC expects her return on investment from entrepreneurs in state (G,K) to satisfy: 
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 RG,EM
m ≥ I
pHπ H ,  ∀m. (13) 
If the entrepreneur has never completed a project, the VC does not know if he is 
competent (even if the entrepreneur once received a private signal indicating that a project 
had mediocre prospects).  In the eyes of the VC, the probability that a manager with n prior 
experiences without success is indeed a competent manager is:  
 ′ θ n ,EM = θ 1− π( )
n
θ 1− π( )n +1−θ < ′ θ EM . (14) 
If the manager has observed pM at least once, he is in state (G,U); he knows that he 
is competent for sure, but the market does not know.  To ensure that he concludes high-
prospect projects but abandons mediocre projects, the market imposes constraints that are 
similar to the ones for state (G,K): 
pH X − ′ R n,EM( )> π H pH + π M pM( ) X − ′ R n +1,EM( ) and 
pM X − ′ R n,EM( )< π H pH + π M pM( ) X − ′ R n +1,EM( ). 
These incentive compatibility constraints simplify to: 
 π H pH + π M pM
pH
< X − ′ R n,EM
X − ′ R n +1,EM
< π H pH + π M pM
pM
. (15) 
Moreover, the VC expects return on investments from entrepreneurs that are not in 
state (G,K) to be:  
 ′ R n,EM ≥ IpHπ H ′ θ n,EM . (16) 
The manager that only received signal pL after n experiences does not know if the 
projects failed because of him or not.  His probability of being in state (U,U) is: 
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 ′ θ n,LM = θπ L
n
θπ Ln +1−θ < ′ θ n,EM . (17) 
If he sees pL once again, he still doesn’t know if he is a competent or a bad 
manager.  He abandons and restarts a new venture because, according to the incentive 
compatibility constraints, X − ′ R n +1,EM( )> 0, indicating that the venture capitalist is willing to 
fund another project at a cost that is acceptable to the entrepreneur.  Hence, unlike those 
in the conservative market, entrepreneurs in the experimental market always have an 
opportunity to attempt a new venture, despite the number of failures they have 
experienced.2 
Case III:  Corporate-funded Employee 
The corporation invests an amount I to launch a project under the leadership of an 
employee.  If successful, both company and employee have positive payoff.  For the 
corporation, the payoff R is the project return.  For the employee, the payoff X could be a 
promotion, a raise or greater "reputation" among colleagues.  Notice that in this 
environment, R >> X, so we do not consider the impact of X on R. 
If the project is not successful, the company loses the initial investment, and the 
employee suffers a loss -K, which may be immaterial, damage to his reputation, loss of 
credibility among colleagues, demotion, or loss of employment.  A risk-neutral employee 
initiates his project if the expected value of his payoff satisfies 
θ π H pH + π M pM( )X − 1−θ π H pH + π M pM( )( )K > 0 . 
Hence, projects are initiated only if: 
                                            
2 This result is quite intriguing, but must be taken with a grain of salt.  As it is currently modeled, the whole 
payoff for both the VC and the entrepreneur occurs at the end of the project, if it is successful.  Hence, the 
entrepreneur’s personal effort is not being considered.  If his time and effort is included in the model as a 
reservation price, and since θn → 0 as n increases, we expect that after n* failures, the entrepreneur will 
choose not to invest his time on his very questionable entrepreneurial talent. 
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θ π H pH + π M pM( )




The employee also has to deal with market imperfections because the employer 
does not know about his competence to complete a project until he has completed at least 
one.  Like the VC, the corporation expects that all projects with high prospects are brought 
to completion, and that mediocre projects be handled according to the organization’s 
willingness to accept risk.3 
In period 0, the employee initiates a project that matures in period 2.  In period 1, 
the employee receives a private signal p about the project. The employee trades off the 
potential gain ( pX − 1− p( )K ) for continuing the project with the certain loss for abandoning 
it immediately (-K).  Consequently, the employee continues if X > -K, which is always true, 
as long as the signal p is greater than 0!4  Moreover, once the employee abandons or 
concludes his project, he may choose to take on another project with payoff space (X, K’). 
Subcase a) Experimental corporation 
We call experimental corporation one that encourages entrepreneurship from its 
employees.  Consequently, if the employee receives a mediocre signal in period 1, it 
expects him to abandon the project and start a new one.  In order to induce these results, 
the corporation should provide a lower benefit to an employee for continuing the mediocre 
project than for starting a new project.  If the employee receives a signal pM, he knows that 
he is competent.  Hence, to induce abandonment and restart, we have that: 
pM X − 1− pM( )K < π H pH + π M pM( )X − 1− π H pH + π M pM( )( ) ′ K − K . 
                                            
3 This is in stark contrast with the financier’s recommendation that all projects with positive NPV should be 
brought to fruition…  However, most corporations prefer not to engage all projects with positive NPV, and 
limit the amount of debt that they commit. 
4 In fact, if the signal is p = 0, the employee is indifferent between stopping and continuing a project that has 
no future.  In practice, this type of masochism would probably not occur, since the manager would accrue no 
satisfaction by investing additional time and effort in a failed project.  To incorporate this dissatisfaction in the 
model, it suffices to make K marginally larger for projects starting in period 2. 
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If the employee receives a signal pH, the employer expects him to continue the 
project, because the payoff of continuing a good project is greater than the payoff of 
abandoning it and starting a new venture:  
pH X − 1− pH( )K > π H pH + π M pM( )X − 1− π H pH + π M pM( )( ) ′ K − K . 
Simplifying these two expressions leads to the incentive compatibility constraints: 
 
pH X + K( )+ ′ K 
π H pH + π M pM( ) > X + ′ K ( )>
pM X + K( )+ ′ K 
π H pH + π M pM( ) (19) 
On the other hand, the employer does not know if a failed employee did so after 
seeing a mediocre signal, which would mean he is competent, or a low signal, which would 
mean his competency is unproven. The risk-neutral employer, not knowing if competent 
employees lead the projects that she funds, requires that the risk level of each venture 
meet the threshold: 
 I
R
≤ pHπ Hθ . (20) 
The transition diagram in Figure 2 can also be used to describe the five states of a 
corporate entrepreneur in an experimental organization.  After n ventures, a manager that 
has seen pH at least once finds himself in state (G,K) because he is good, and this is 
publicly known.  To ensure that the entrepreneur always concludes high-prospect projects 
and always foregoes mediocre projects, the incentive compatibility constraints are: 
pH X − 1− pH( )KG,ECm > π H pH + π M pM( )X − 1− π H pH + π M pM( )( )KG,ECm +1 − KG,ECm  and 
pM X − 1− pM( )KG,ECm < π H pH + π M pM( )X − 1− π H pH + π M pM( )( )KG,ECm +1 − KG,ECm  
… where m is the number of failed ventures since the manager last experienced a 
successful venture.  These constraints simplify to: 
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pH X + KG,ECm( )+ KG,ECm +1
π H pH + π M pM( ) > X + KG,EC
m +1( )> pM X + KG,ECm( )+ KG,ECm +1π H pH + π M pM( ) . (21) 
This incentive compatibility constraint applies both to managers that have 
experienced past success as well as to those that are observing pH for the first time.  Since 
the employee concludes only those projects that have high prospects, the employer funds 
projects proposed by employees in state (G,K) that satisfy: 
 I
R
≤ pHπ H . (22) 
After n-1 attempts, if the employee has observed a signal pM at least once, but 
never observed pH, he knows that he is competent, and he has just as much chance as 
any employee in state (G,K) to manage a project successfully.  However, he may have 
been stigmatized for his lack of success.  To ensure that he continues to propose new 
projects, the experimental organization limits his stigma to: 
 
π H pH + π M pM( )




This is the second incentive compatibility constraint in the experimental corporation.  
It ensures that employees in state (G,U) have the opportunity to take on new projects.  
Finally, if the employee never observed pH nor pM, he is in state (U,U) if he is good, or in 
state (B,U) if he is bad.  He does not know if his projects failed because of him or not, and 
he suffers the unavoidable personal loss each time his project fails.  His probability of 
being competent is: 
 θn,LC = θπ L
n
θπ Ln +1−θ < θ . (24) 
Considering that his probability of being competent decreases with each attempt, 
the failed entrepreneur starts a new project only if: 
 
θn,LC π H pH + π M pM( )
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Employees who have not yet concluded any projects are in state (G,U), (U,U) or 
(B,U), and the employer cannot distinguish them.  In the eyes of the employer, the 
probability that one such employee is competent is: 
 θn,EC = θ π M + π L( )
n
θ π M + π L( )n +1−θ < θ . (25) 
Hence, the employer funds projects initiated by employees that are not in state 




≤ pHπ Hθn,EC ,  ∀n . (26) 
This threshold limits the scope of new ventures and the number of attempts by 
employees without successful experience. 
Subcase b) Conservative corporation 
A conservative corporation is defined as one that avoids high-risk projects.  Hence, 
whenever an employee observes pH or pM, he is expected to complete the project rather 
than taking on another venture.  His personal payoff is greater continuing the venture than 
abandoning it, leading to: 
pM X − 1− pM( )K > π H pH + π M pM( )X − 1− π H pH + π M pM( )( ) ′ K − K . 
Consequently, the first incentive compatibility constraint is: 
 pM X + K( )> π H pH + π M pM( ) X + ′ K ( )− ′ K . (27) 
With this constraint, an employee that observes pH would consider nothing other 
than continuing his project.  However, if the employee observes pL, he abandons and 
suffers personal loss, but he may still engage in a new project. The risk-neutral employer, 
not knowing if inexperienced employees are competent, requires that their ventures meet 
the threshold: 




≤ θ pHπ H + pM π M( ). (28) 
The transition diagram in Figure 1 represents the four states of conservative 
corporate entrepreneurship.  If the manager’s record shows at least one successful event, 
he is in state G, and is expected to finish all projects for which he gets a private signal pH 
or pM. Thus: 
pM X + KG,CCm( )> π H pH + π M pM( ) X + KG,CCm +1( )− KG,CCm +1  
… where m is the number of successive failures since the last success.  Since the 
employer concludes all projects that have high-level or mediocre prospects, the employer 




≤ pHπ H + pM π M( ). (29) 
To ensure some entrepreneurship in this conservative organization, his stigma is 
limited to: 
 
π H pH + π M pM( )




,  ∀n . (30) 
If the record shows that an employee has seen only failures, neither the employer 
nor the employee knows if he is good or not.  The probability that he is in state U, given 
that he has seen pL in all n ventures that he has experienced, is: 
 θn,CC = θπ L
n
θπ Ln +1−θ < θ . (31) 
Considering that the probability of being competent decreases with each failed 
attempt, the failed entrepreneur starts a new project only if: 
 
θn,CC π H pH + π M pM( )
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To fund the next venture instigated by experienced employees that are not in state 




≤ pHπ Hθn,CC ,  ∀n . (33) 
Subcase c) Ultra-conservative corporation 
We call ultra-conservative the corporation with extremely low tolerance for project 
failures.  In such an environment, employees that failed once will face high hurdles leading 
future projects.  This type of organization would stigmatize failed managers, making sure 
that, if they observe pM, they complete the project; and if they observe pL, future projects 
won’t receive corporate support.  Obviously, some entrepreneurship is desirable, so 
successful employees are well-rewarded for completing their projects. 
If an employee observes pM, he avoids the stigma of failure and continues his 
project.  Continuing the project has a better personal payoff than abandoning: 
pM X + K( )> π H pH + π M pM( ) X + ′ K ( )− ′ K . 
This incentive compatibility constraint is similar to the one in the conservative 
corporation.  The risk-neutral employer, not knowing if competent employees lead the 





≤ θ pHπ H + pM π M( ). (34) 
Likewise, a manager that observes pL suffers personal loss –K and abandons the 
project.  The probability that he is a competent employee is: 
 ′ θ UC = θπ Lθπ L +1−θ < θ . (35) 
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To ensure that the failed employee does not initiate a new venture, his personal 
payoff in a second attempt must be negative.  This is achieved by setting a high stigma for 
failing a project a second time, K’, which is secured by the expression: 
 
′ θ UC π H pH + π M pM( )




For the ultra-conservative employer, the implicit risk in projects by managers that 




> ′ θ UC pHπ H + pM π M( ). (37) 
This scenario can be represented by the three-state transition diagram in Figure 3, 
in which employees move from state 0 (inexperienced) to state G (good) or state S 
(stigmatized).  Proposing projects in this environment is a dangerous gamble since, after a 
sufficient number of experiences, all managers eventually fail and become stigmatized. 
 
Figure 3.  Transition Diagram (3 states) 
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3.  Discussion 
Rather than discussing the model interpretation and related literature separately, in 
this section we discuss them jointly.  We organize this discussion around several themes 
that are germane to the model.   
3.1 How does corporate culture affect the incentives for corporate 
entrepreneurship? 
Our model is related to the strategic management literature on corporate 
entrepreneurship.  Research on corporate entrepreneurship suggests that, in some 
environments, a significant relationship exists between entrepreneurial behavior and 
performance in organizations both large and small (Zahra & Covin, 1995). Whereas 
Landier’s concern is with the entrepreneurial culture of industries and regions, a central 
concern in strategic management theory is the role of corporate culture in nurturing 
employee behaviors that may ultimately lead to competitive advantage (Barney, 1991). 
Corporate culture may be viewed as, “a substitute for explicit communication. That is, 
culture is an unspoken language giving directives to the members of an organization” 
(Cremer, 1993).  Burgelman (1983) suggests that senior management is influential in 
setting the environment for employee behaviors by how they manage failure in their 
organizations. In his formulation, Burgelman (1983, p. 1361) asserts, “Autonomous 
strategic behavior emerges, by definition, spontaneously. Corporate management thus 
need not encourage entrepreneurship; it need only make sure not to suppress it.”5 Other 
scholars have also argued that core organizational values and beliefs play a fundamental 
role in nurturing corporate entrepreneurship (Guth & Ginsberg, 1990; Zahra, 1991). 
Stevenson and Jarillo (1990, p. 24) argue that, “the treatment of failure would appear to be 
a critical component of the necessary motivation to pursue opportunity.” Indeed, they 
hypothesized that organizations that attach less negative consequences to failure would 
exhibit more entrepreneurial behaviors. In an experimental study, Lee, Edmondson, 
                                            
5 Emphasis added. 
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Thomke, and Worline (2004) have identified tolerance for failure is indeed an important 
variable influencing employees’ willingness to engage in experimental behaviors. 
Our study contributes to this literature by showing that a particular aspect of 
corporate culture (the extent to which the culture stigmatizes failure) can be modeled as a 
relatively simple information asymmetry problem. As earlier noted, our starting point was 
the model proposed by Landier (2005). The central insight generated in Landier’s paper is 
that multiple equilibria may arise corresponding to different attitudes of entrepreneurs and 
capital markets towards entrepreneurial failure.  Landier’s model is supported by an 
empirical study by Bengtsson (2005), who examined data on the restart behavior of failed 
entrepreneurs in different geographies. Bengtsson found that the disproportionately large 
amount of venture capital activity in California could partly be explained by Californian 
investors attaching a lower stigma to failed entrepreneurs. Landier’s paper also 
corresponds with anecdotal data on the role of the stigma of failure in different 
geographies and industries, such as differences between investor attitudes towards failure 
in the US, France and Japan. Our model confirms these insights and extends them to the 
realm of corporate entrepreneurship, illustrating that the (dis)incentives for employees to 
engage in entrepreneurial behaviors can also be modeled within Landier’s framework (i.e., 
we show this is also the case inside corporations). To use an analogy, corporations may 
have their own Californias (i.e., divisions that attach a low stigma to failure), and they may 
have their Japans (i.e., divisions that strongly penalize failure). At the limit, we have shown 
that ultra-conservative corporations will drive out entrepreneurial behavior—since after a 
sufficient number of trials, all managers will eventually fail and become stigmatized. 
3.2 Why might existing firms choose to incubate new business 
initiatives as separate entities? 
Our model also contributes to the literature regarding when innovations are 
commercialized within established organizations and when they are commercialized using 
corporate ventures that are standalone divisions of a corporation (Christensen, 1997). In 
recent years, a literature that addresses methods of commercializing innovations has 
developed (Gans & Stern, 2002; Cassiman & Ueda, 2006; Hellmann, 2007; Klepper & 
Sleeper, 2005). The focus of this literature is largely on if an innovation is instigated by an 
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existing organization or if it is commercialized by an independent start-up.  However, there 
is also the related question of when (and why) an existing organization chooses to set-up a 
separate, wholly-owned venture for the commercialization of a new business idea, rather 
than develop the new business within its existing organizational infrastructure.  For 
instance, when IBM developed the PC, it established a new venture based in Florida, away 
from the parent company infrastructure in New Jersey. Similarly, Lockheed’s famous skunk 
works was deliberately set-up as an independent venture outside the corporate 
organization, albeit wholly-owned by the parent. Our model suggests one possible 
explanation for such decisions: the independently managed organizations are free to 
develop their own (more experimental) culture, less encumbered by the (conservative) 
culture of the parent organization. As such, they can develop an appropriate cultural 
regime that includes different expectations about the way to treat failure. This suggests 
that partitioning corporations into divisions may sometimes be motivated by efforts to 
establish different governance regimes with regard to failure management (Williamson, 
1985). 
A closely related issue is identified in a paper by Gromb and Scharfstein (2003).  It 
concerns the reassignment of failed “intrapreneurs” within a corporation.  In their model, 
the critical assumption is that firms and markets differ in their ability to observe and retain 
information about the skills and abilities of individuals. Intrapreneurship enables firms to 
learn about individuals and redeploy failed, but able, managers to new projects within the 
firm. Poorly performing intrapreneurs are stigmatized: no one wants to hire them because 
those that are on the job market are ones that established firms have chosen not to retain. 
By contrast, being a failed independent entrepreneur is not as bad a signal as that 
associated with being fired from an established firm: independent failure does not convey 
as much information about the ability of the entrepreneur. Gromb and Scharfstein’s model 
thus adds another dimension to the analysis we develop in this paper by highlighting the 
role that more- or less-accurate information regimes may have in stigmatizing individuals. 
Again, the underlying insight is that noisy information regimes (i.e., experimental ones) are 
less likely to result in a stigma of failure than regimes in which inferences about individual 
abilities can be made more accurately (i.e., more conservative regimes).  
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3.3 Does stigma of failure also occur in public-sector 
organizations? 
According to Morris and Kuratko (2002), the term entrepreneurship has appeared 
with increasing frequency in the public administration literature since the early 1990s.  
These authors argue that entrepreneurship is a universal construct that can be applied to 
public-sector organizations because the underlying dimensions of entrepreneurial behavior 
are the same regardless of context (Morris & Kuratko, 2002, p. 324). If this is so, then a 
logical question is: what role does stigma of failure play in public organizations? These 
organizations are typically viewed as highly conservative and might be expected to 
stigmatize failure in significant ways. According to Morris and Kuratko, “There is also 
career-related risk in the public sector, for although it is difficult to fire people, 
advancement can be hampered by visible failures” (p. 309).  
To investigate this issue further, we undertook our own informal survey.  We 
contacted four experienced DoD (Department of Defense) project managers and asked 
them whether project managers in the DoD were stigmatized for project failures. The 
results of this (admittedly anecdotal) process surprised us: the consistent answer these 
experienced PMs gave us is that failure is not stigmatized. We reason that there are two 
explanations for this. Both explanations cut to the heart of why stigma of failure occurs in 
the first place. 
First, in Landier’s formulation, stigma of failure occurs as a result of informational 
constraints. Because the skill of entrepreneurs is difficult to observe directly, outsiders are 
forced to make inferences about individuals’ skills and abilities using observable 
information, such as venture success or failure. Information about project success or 
failure may be used in place of, or to augment, direct observation of an individual’s abilities 
(Holmstrom, 1999).  However, if skill is independently verifiable, then the necessity of 
making vicarious inferences is eliminated. In the case of project management in the DoD, 
individuals follow a specific career-development program that involves several screening 
processes and the attainment of professional qualifications. As such, individual skills are 
verified through this career-development process.  This process considerably decreases 
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the value of information about individual project successes and failures.  This is especially 
so when a second factor is considered, as follows. 
A second factor that might explain why there is little stigma associated with project 
failures in the DoD is the environmental context. For a typical large-scale DoD project, 
many factors pertinent to project success (or failure) are outside the direct control of the 
project manager.  Numerous stakeholders have interests in such projects and seek to 
influence the outcomes of projects through political processes. Furthermore, many projects 
are long-lived, which means that several different project managers rotate through the 
project during its lifetime. These factors make observers more hesitant to attribute project 
outcome to individual project managers’ performance, because the link between project 
outcome and individual performance is significantly diluted.   
For these reasons, despite their conservatism, some public organizations appear 
not to stigmatize failure in the same way it is observed in private organizations. Without 
further investigation, we do not know to what extent our anecdotal evidence on DoD 
project management also applies to other public-sector operations. However, we note that 
further research in this area might be useful in determining the external validity of the 
model of corporate entrepreneurship we have developed in this paper.   
3.4 Is the development of corporate entrepreneurship path-
dependent? 
The existence of a cognitive basis for domain-specific expertise (as delineated by 
Baron & Ensley, 2006; Mitchell, Smith, Seawright, & Morse, 2000; Sarasvathy, 2001) 
suggests that entrepreneurial success (especially over the course of several ventures or 
an individual’s career) may be a function of skill rather than luck. If this is the case, might 
there be ways of evaluating entrepreneurial talent directly, rather than relying on vicarious 
inferences drawn from the success or failure of entrepreneurial ventures?  Who would 
have the strongest incentives to invest in improving the independent evaluation of 
entrepreneurial ability? Are there coordination difficulties among entrepreneurs and 
evaluators that result in path-dependence in the development of entrepreneurial talent in a 
corporation?  
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Supporting Section 3.3, we note that in Landier’s formulation, stigma of failure is an 
informational problem. Like many other informational problems, there may be multiple 
ways of—at least partially—solving this problem. Organizations (such as corporations or, 
in the case of independent entrepreneurship, venture capitalists) may be able to improve 
their screening processes by investing in formal evaluation processes that enable them to 
more accurately assess the entrepreneurial abilities of individuals independently of 
success or failure in past ventures. Formal organizational structures, such as human 
resources departments, also have the authority to directly observe individuals and collect 
significant quantities of data about them (for example, using 360-degree evaluation 
processes). Even venture capitalists may develop skills in screening and evaluating 
entrepreneurial talent, independent of the particular investment opportunities offered to 
them. 
One upshot of our model is that, to the extent that corporations can lower the cost of 
evaluating entrepreneurial skill levels, direct evaluation may substitute the indirect 
inferences stakeholders draw from venture failure about the entrepreneurial skills and 
abilities of individuals. One can infer from our model that a change in the cost of evaluation 
technologies would lead to different “cultural” equilibriums in organizations, developing 
corporate cultures that would be more accepting of entrepreneurial failure. If corporations 
could better identify high-ability individuals who failed in previous ventures, they could offer 
them a lower cost of capital in future ventures.  This would encourage more restarts and 
create value for the firm. 
There are, of course, several problems in investing in screening entrepreneurial 
skills. One is that before a firm can accurately identify employees with entrepreneurial 
skills, they need managers who are themselves entrepreneurially skilled. A recent paper 
by Bernhardt, Hughson, and Kutsoati (2006) studies the strategic incentives that this 
creates. To summarize, workers are likely to distort investments toward skills that a firm’s 
managers can best evaluate (as well as attempt to manipulate evaluator’s judgments 
about their skills by their choice of project and by manipulating perceptions about their role 
in project successes and failures—Amit, Glosten, & Muller, 1990; Holmstrom, 1999). In a 
dynamic context (in which workers one day become managers), the population of skills in 
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an organization may skew over time. This may explain the low levels of entrepreneurship 
in many corporations: it suggests that the development of corporate entrepreneurship 
depends on having a combination of managers (skilled entrepreneurial evaluation) and 
employees (skilled entrepreneurship). 
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4.  Conclusion 
The ancient Greeks and Romans used branding irons and knives to cut and burn 
physical signs—“stigmata”—onto the foreheads of slaves, criminals and traitors to 
advertise their moral status as unfit for society (Goffman, 1963).  In the middle ages, the 
ritual pollution of individuals by slicing and scorching stigmata into the flesh was redirected 
towards people with mental disorders.  In modern societies, people with mental illnesses 
are no longer physically mutilated, but stigmas of various kinds remain powerful social 
mechanisms. The stigma of failure is perhaps nowhere more intense than in the modern 
corporation, where ferocious competition in many industries creates enormous pressure on 
individual employees to be successful. In this paper, we have examined the role that 
different corporate cultures may play in stigmatizing entrepreneurial failure using a formal 
model of the (dis)incentives for entrepreneurial behavior in corporations. This model 
extends Landier’s work on the stigma of failure into the corporate firm by examining the 
implications of more conservative and more experimental corporate cultures on the 
incentives for the corporate-funded employee.  Understanding the influence of corporate 
culture about failure may be important to this discussion, since prior research has found a 
significant relationship exists between entrepreneurial behavior and performance in both 
large and small organizations in many environments (Zahra & Covin 1995). Future 
research might usefully test this model and explore other interactions between corporate 
cultures and entrepreneurial activity.  
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Appendix:  Summary of Results 
Case I: Self-financed Entrepreneur 
 state 0 state G state U or B (unknown to entrepreneur) 
Payoff θ π H pH + π M pM( )X − I  π H pH + π M pM( )X − I  ′ θ n π H pH + π M pM( )X − I  
signal 
pH 
Continues project to 
earn pH X . 
Continues project to 
earn pH X . 
Continues project to earn 
pH X . 
signal 
pM 
Continues project to 
earn pM X . 
Continues project to 
earn pM X . 
Continues project to earn 
pM X . 
signal 
pL 
Stops.  Starts new 
project if 
′ θ π H pH + π M pM( )X − I > 0
Stops, and starts new 
project to earn 
π H pH + π M pM( )X − I  
Stops, and starts new 
project if 
′ θ n +1 π H pH + π M pM( )X − I > 0
 
Subcase II-A:  VC-funded Entrepreneur in a Conservative 
Market 
 state 0 state G state U or B (unknown to VC and to entrepreneur) 
VC 
payoff 
RCM = IpM π M + pHπ H( )θ  RG,CM =
I
pM π M + pHπ H
′ R n,CM = IpM π M + pHπ H( ) ′ θ n,CM
signal 
pH 
Continues project to 
earn pH X − RCM( ). 
Continues project to 
earn pH X − RG,CM( ). 
Continues project to earn 
pH X − ′ R n,CM( ). 
signal 
pM 
Continues project to 
earn pM X − RCM( ). 
Continues project to 
earn pM X − RG,CM( ). 
Continues project to earn 
pM X − ′ R CM( ). 
signal 
pL 
Stops, and starts new 
project if 
′ θ CM π H pH + π M pM( ) X − ′ R CM( )> 0
Stops, and starts new 
project to earn 
π H pH + π M pM( ) X − RG,CM( ) 
Stops, and starts new 
project if 
′ θ n +1,CM π H pH + π M pM( ) X − ′ R n,CM( )> 0
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Subcase II-B:  VC-funded Entrepreneur in an Experimental 
Market 
 state 0 state (G,K) state (G,U) state (U,U) or (B,U) 
VC 
payoff 
REM = IpHπ Hθ  RG,EM
m ≥ I
pHπ H ,  ∀m ′ R n,EM ≥
I




project to earn 
pH X − REM( ). 
Continues project 
to earn 
pH X − RG,EMm( ). Continues project to earn pH X − ′ R n,EM( ). 
signal 
pM 
Stops, and starts new project to earn 





project to earn 
π H pH X − ′ R EM( ). 
Stops, and starts 
new project to 
earn 
pH X − RG,EMm +1( ). 
Stops, and starts 
new project to 
earn 
π H pH X − ′ R n +1,EM( ).
Stops, and starts new 
project to earn 
′ θ n +1,EM π H pH X − ′ R n +1,EM( ).
 
Subcase III-A:  Experimental Corporate Entrepreneurship 





≤ pHπ Hθ  IR ≤ pHπ H  
I
R




project to earn 
pH X − 1− pH( )K . 
Continues project 
to earn 
pH X − 1− pH( )KG,ECm .
Continues project to earn pH X − 1− pH( ) ′ K n,EC .
signal 
pM 
Stops, and starts new project to earn 
pH X − 1− pH( ) ′ K n +1,EC . 
signal 
pL 
Stops, and starts 
new project to 
earn 
pH X − 1− pH( ) ′ K EC . 
Stops, and starts 
new project to earn 
pH X − 1− pH( )KG,ECm +1 . Stops, and starts new project to earn 
pH X − 1− pH( ) ′ K n +1,EC . 
Stops, and starts new 
project if 
θn +1,LCπ H pH
1−θn +1,LCπ H pH >
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Subcase III-B:  Conservative Corporate Entrepreneurship 





≤ θ pHπ H + pM π M( ) IR ≤ pHπ H + pM π M( ) 
I
R
≤ pHπ Hθn,CC ,  ∀n  
signal 
pH 
Continues project to earn 
pH X − 1− pH( )K . 
Continues project to 
earn 
pH X − 1− pH( )KG,CCm . 
Continues project to 
earn pH X − 1− pH( ) ′ K n,CC . 
signal 
pM 
Continues project to earn 
pM X − 1− pM( )K . 
Continues project to 
earn 
pM X − 1− pM( )KG,CCm . 
Continues project to 
earn pM X − 1− pM( ) ′ K n ,CC . 
signal 
pL 
Stops, and starts new 
project if 
′ θ CC π H pH + π M pM( )
1− ′ θ CC π H pH + π M pM( ) >
′ K CC
X
Stops, and starts new 
project to earn 
π H pH + π M pM( )X
− 1− π H pH + π M pM( )( )KG,CCm +1
Stops, and starts new 
project if 
θn,CC π H pH + π M pM( )





Subcase III-C:  Ultra-conservative Corporate Entrepreneurship 





≤ θ pHπ H + pM π M( ) IR ≤ pHπ H + pM π M( ) 
I
R
> ′ θ UC pHπ H + pM π M( ) 
signal 
pH 
Continues project to 
earn pH X − 1− pH( )K . 
Continues project to 
earn pH X − 1− pH( ) ′ K . N/A 
signal 
pM 
Continues project to 
earn pM X − 1− pM( )K . 
Continues project to 
earn pM X − 1− pM( ) ′ K . N/A 
signal 
pL 
Stops. Stops. N/A 
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